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Abstract 
 
Contemporary literature on dialogue focuses particularly on Bohmian dialogue. 
One argument may be the ability of this dialogue theory to match with modern 
communication tools, especially through Internet. Also, the major theme of Bohm theory, 
the open dialogue, has been developed technologically as an “open space” where all 
dialogues, whatever aims or subject, may possible.  
This paper states that the dialogue processes differs in nature, and one particular 
process do not result from an arbitrary option. The foresight, for instance, does not 
consist in a dialogue related to one specific topic, whatever complex and extended might 
be. The dialogue, in this case, may be seen as a support action for the foresight activity, 
or as a resource which may offer solutions for sustaining it. This is a ‘dialogue in’ for the 
foresight, and the discussions may focus on various related themes: sustainability, 
science-society dialogue, environmental policy etc. The purpose of this dialogue is to 
reveal new meanings for ‘foresight’, as a second-order significant. Certainly, words like 
future, vision, forecast etc. may not be mentioned, but any loss in meaning:  in fact, there 
is a third-order of signification for these words.  
Dialogue might be also considered as an activity itself, even in relation with 
foresight. This is a ‘dialogue about’ the subject, which is concerned on a denotative 
meaning of the word: the dialogue will emphasize the connotations of the related words 
like future, vision, forecast etc. and the purpose is to negotiate a common meaning for the 
subject-word, foresight. 
When a dialogue is an ongoing process, it creates stable communication 
structures, or dialogical groups. It is natural to consider the emergence of one group 
having a certain a priori purpose, even it appears accidentally. The word ‘purpose’ might 
refers to debate a subject, to reach an agreement or to explore the significations of one 
term. It is also natural to examine how adequate is the structure, and it might be 
expressed in two ways: how large should be the group, and how many time is necessary 
to reach the purposed objective. 
Starting and sustaining dialogical structures depends strongly on nature of the 
activity to be supported by the dialogue, available resources and objectives. Foresight 
dialogue is, in fact, a “mix of dialogues” which proves the homogeneity of the field. 
 
Keywords: dialogue, communication, semiotics, dialogue about, dialogue in, 
efficient dialogue, foresight ;JEL classification : A12, A14 
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Nature of dialogue 
 
Etymologically, the word’s origins are in Greek (diá = through, logos = word, 
speech), which mean “what can be revealed by words”; particularly, and more adequate, 
considers Bohm (Bohm, 1991), the translation of “logos” should be “meaning of the 
word”. The basic concept on the nature of the dialogue reflects a “reciprocal 
conversation” between two or more persons, and this is the most usual sense of the word, 
scarcely modified since the ancient times.  
1. When reproduced in writing, “dialogue” labels a form of literature for 
rhetorical, entertainment and instruction purposes. Historically, the technique of the 
dialogue in literature dates back to the Indian epic poem Mahabharata (6th century BC, 
and, probably, some of its older parts, 8th century BC). For the Mahabharata’s author the 
dialogue is a narrative support, not very closed to the sense of “conversation”. By the 
dialogue the author attempts to emphasize the explanations of the relationship of the 
individual to society and the world (the nature of the ‘Self’) and the workings of karma. 
2. In Western European culture is Plato (c. 427 BC - c. 347 BC) who introduces 
dialogue as an independent form of literature and uses it systematically in his whole 
works (except the Apology). For Plato, the dialogue has a different signification than a 
simply “conversation”. 
In Plato’s view, the dialogue is a tool to reach the truth, emphasizing the 
gnoseologic dimension of dialogue. This philosophical sense of “dialogue” is due to an 
explicit or implicit disagreement or ambiguity present in the theme of the dialogue, and 
the purpose of the dialogue is to eliminate it. The typical way is to ask the partner some 
questions on theme until a disagreement between disputed beliefs or hypothesis is 
revealed. Then the interlocutor has to see the impossibility and will try other hypothesis, 
which is again a subject of dialogue; the dialogue will end not necessary with a final 
resolution.  
The Plato’s dialogue structure is argumentative, as well as the opponent learn 
from the contact with the interlocutor. This is an adequate form to capture subtle nuances 
of the discourse and to impose viewpoints, and it appears to be the most important Plato’s 
inheritance of the dialogue’s meanings. The systematic use of the dialogue – sometimes 
as imaginary dialogues between peoples who never could meet together – in the 
philosophical literature (and not only) has a long tradition, from middle age to modern 
period1.  
3. The existentialism brings another view on the role of the dialogue, 
metaphorical and complex, strongly related to the human existence. Martin Bubber 
(1868-1965) places the dialogue in the centre of its philosophical system, but as an 
effective means of the ongoing conversation instead of a mode to reach any conclusion or 
to express viewpoint.  
Bubber’s dialogue is purely ontological. The author stresses that the premise of 
existence is encounter. The dialogue is, in his view, a mode of consciousness, interaction, 
and being through which an individual engages with other individuals, inanimate objects, 
and all reality in general.  
                                                 
1 Fontenelle (1683) and Fenelon (1712), for example, wrote the “Dialogues of the Dead”, George Berkeley 
(1713) “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”, Walter Savage Landor (1828) “Imaginary 
Conversations”, etc. 
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Bubber explain his philosophy using words pair Ich-Du (dialogue) and Ich-Es 
(monologue) to categorize the dual modes through which an individual exists and 
actualizes that existence. Ich-Du is a relationship to describe the mutual, holistic 
existence of two beings. It is an authentic encounter, because one meets another 
individual in their real existence, where imagination and ideas do not play any role. Ich-
Es is the opposite of Ich-Du, a relationship where peoples do not actually meet. In this 
relationship the peoples, objects etc. are conceptualized, and became mental 
representations, instead of real beings, existing only as thoughts. Essentially, this form of 
objectivity relates to the world in terms of the self – how an object can serve the 
individual’s interest. The human existence is an oscillation between these two modes of 
being, between monologue and dialogue, between conceptualization and interaction. 
4. The most influential concept of “dialogue” is developed by David Bohm. The 
quantum physicist observed that the functioning of brain follows the model of the 
hologram, in accordance with the quantum mathematical principles and the wave 
pattern2. As well, the representations in the brain (images), including traditions, beliefs 
and habits shape the real world as patterns of thought. Later, and in accordance with these 
observations, Bohm states that thought is a largely collective phenomenon, which is 
possible through communication and culture. Bohm propose a systematic nature of 
thought: “What I mean by ‘thought’ is the whole thing - thought, ‘felt’, the body, the 
whole society sharing thoughts – it’s all one process. It is essential for me not to break 
that up, because it’s all one process; somebody else’s thoughts becomes my thoughts, and 
vice versa. Therefore it would be wrong and misleading to break it up into my thoughts, 
your thoughts, my feelings, these feelings, those feelings... I would say that thought makes 
what is often called in modern language a system” (Bohm, 1992, p. 18).  
It result that the images of the observations we make on real world and the 
assumptions of our judgments have a transpersonal dimension, and all these patterns 
form an “ocean of meanings” which is influenced by human conversation. This process is 
called by the author dialogue.  
In the author’s view, conversation denotes a Platonian dialogue, where each 
interlocutor defends his position; a more adequate name is discussion. By contrast, the 
dialogue suppose sharing thinking and feelings in an ‘ocean of meaning’, which 
continually flows and evolves, as well as peoples involved in dialogue reach new, deeper 
levels of understanding which none could have foreseen. Through dialogue “a new kind 
of mind begins to come into being, based on the development of common meaning... 
People are no longer primarily in opposition, nor can they be said to be interacting, 
rather they are participating in this pool of common meaning, which is capable of 
constant development and change” (Bohm, 1992, p. 20).  
Bohmian dialogue is at core at his epistemological system. Essentially, 
dialoguing mean an exploration among collective beliefs. Participants examine the 
assumptions underlying their individual understanding and common knowledge to reveal 
                                                 
2 The scientific and philosophical works of David Bohm cannot be actually separated. The holonomic 
model of brain function, developed by the neurobiologist Karl Pribram in collaboration with David Bohm, 
theorizes that memory/information is stored not in cells, but rather in wave interference patterns. Bohm’s 
research on cognition and thought started earlier, and a great influence on his work had the philosophy of 
Krishnamurti (1959): “I was impressed by the way his own [Krishnamurti] philosophical meshed with my 
ideas on quantum mechanics” (Bohm, 1980). 
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blind spots and incoherencies. Bohm emphasize that this collective learning increases our 
collective intelligence an leads to greater connection, understanding and harmony.  
5. It is interesting to observe that the evolution of the concepts on “dialogue” 
added new meanings, but never create a substitute for one or all the previous. In fact, the 
nature of dialogue result from the context, and a certain meanings is adequate to the 
contents’ specificity: dialogue is a narrative support in a drama, a way to find the truth 
for teaching purposes, a mode of conscience and interaction in participative 
environments and an exploration tool in negotiation, and the list may continue.  
Also, the dialogue can take different forms in the same context and evolve from 
one nature to other. The narrative support can dissimulate a mode of conscience as well 
as an exploration tool; or, in participative environments the dialogue is often 
argumentative, especially when the purpose of the meeting is to reach an agreement. It is 
almost impossible to find a single aspect in a dialogue process, and this is why we may 
say that dialogue is “gregarious” in nature. 
 
Dialogue and communication 
 
Whatever definitions we accept for “dialogue” and its nature, it is obvious that the 
process consist in communicate or exchanging messages. Is the dialogue a form of 
communication? Paradoxically, the answer for this question is not so obvious. 
Indeed, dialogue is not and cannot be a subject for the theory of communication3, 
if we consider it literally (fig. bellow). 
 
  
 
Communication considers the message as a chain of signals sent through a 
channel, and focuses on the technical conditions of the connection or the fidelity of the 
transmission: how adequate is the signal (encoded) according the environment (channel), 
how accurate is the reception of the message (decoded), the status of the source of signals 
and the message’s receiver, the feed back connection, the structure of the communication 
                                                 
3 We consider the classical approach in the communication theory, as Hartley, Shannon and Weaver stated 
it for the first time (see Shannon, 1948). Later, this theory became the information theory, but no arguments 
for this transformation as long as it is almost unmodified. Recent developments, using same model, inferred 
new elements in the communication process, notably semiotic rules: syntactic, pragmatic and semantic. As 
well, the theory of communication became communication science, with many branches: non-verbal 
communication, symbolic communication, animal communication, mass communication, interpersonal 
communication, organizational communication etc. In fact, we can consider this evolution as a restriction 
applied on the original model and resuming communication at a single code: the language.  
 5
etc. This theory does not operate with the content of message, because any set of 
successive signals faces same technical problems in a communication connection4.  
The content of the message is a subject for semiotics, which associates certain 
signification for certain message. In this case, the message is a fixed set of signals, 
reproduced identically in all cases when it is used, as well as this structure conserve a 
defined meaning, accepted both by the sender and the receiver of the message. Semiotics 
does not suppose any fixed technical structure to send messages, in the sense of the 
communication theory, it presume that a connection exist and has no technical problems. 
The dialogue process supposes both a communication pattern and a fixed meaning 
for the message, and it can be theorized as a form of communication and a semiotic 
structure. More adequate is to consider dialogue to be an interdisciplinary field, situated 
between communication and semiotics. This theory, says Foerster5 “consists of many 
parts, including an architectural model of languaging, a detailed semantic logic, a 
formulaic representation of agreement, and vast data on the nature of individualized 
learning in many modes.” 
1. As a special form of communication, we must note that dialogue refers strictly 
to human interactions, whatever we name it: conversation, debate, negotiation etc. 
Technically, to transmit messages through dialogue do not suppose any special 
infrastructure, except the conditions to put together the participants – meeting, phone, 
letters etc., and to use same code – language.  
The communications structures appear related to the number of participants, and 
the simplest is when two peoples talk together. Blake (1996) considers this structure to be 
a “dyalogue” (not “dialogue”), and support three kind of interaction, according to the 
logic of inclusiveness, exclusiveness and sameness: YES-AND, NO-BUT, and, in 
sameness, “when one person stops talking, the other continues as if with the same voice” 
(p. 19).  
More sophisticated structures emerge when more than two persons are involved in 
dialogue; the author names it “trialogue”, “tetralogue”… N-logue, according the number 
of participants. In the tetralogue structure, for example, the participants are connected as 
in the figure bellow:  
 
 
 
The communication inside this structure, says the author, is a combination of 
“dyalogues”, “what is said by any one of the people is affected not only by the person 
who spoke before but by all the others as well. The net result is akin to a ‘rotation’ 
                                                 
4 Weaver stated and emphasized this as a basic assumption of the communication theory. Later, other 
authors criticized it, arguing that this hypothesis transform the theory in a purely technical one, without 
consideration for human communication.  
5 See Pagano, 1993 
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around an idea or theme, which is seen from different perspectives - as a piece of 
sculpture viewed from various sides” (p. 21). 
From the communication theory point of view, the result of the interactions in the 
dialogue process is a network, where the connections can emerge spontaneously or can be 
deliberately designed. Inside a network, two communication patterns are possible: two-
ways communication (each participant is connected with only one other and can react 
immediately, like in telecommunication network) or one-way communication (when all 
participants are connected simultaneously at one speaker and cannot react immediately, 
like broadcasting communications).  
Blake considers the second pattern to be adequate for ‘monalogue’ (not 
‘monologue’, which means ‘meditation’), and not for all other structures, as long as 
participants are active parts in the communication process. This distinction is quite 
fragile.   
We will consider the action in dialogue when an actor adopts one of the three 
positions: inclusiveness, exclusiveness and sameness. The position may be implicit or 
explicit, according to the rules of the present dialogue process. Following the distinction 
drawn by Blake, only if the position is revealed immediately, so if the position is explicit 
in the present dialogue process, the communication pattern is ‘dyalogue’ or ‘N-logue’, 
otherwise is ‘monalogue’. But the moment of the effective reaction is important if we 
attempt to establish the efficiency of the dialogue process, not for the patterns’ definition: 
a forthcoming dialogue process will make, possibly, the implicit position an explicit one. 
In this assumption, the implicit and explicit positions worth equally for the dialogue 
structure, ‘monalogue’ support same kind of interaction as ‘dyalogue’ and, in fact, 
‘monalogue’ is a ‘dyalogue’ where the participants’ positions are hidden in actual 
communication process.  
This argument proves that the communication pattern of the dialogue process is a 
two-way type; this is similar to state that dialogue presumes an interactive 
communication, which is true by excellence. 
2. In later versions of Shannon’s model of communication appears a feedback 
connection6 between the receiver and source which generated a lot of interpretations. 
One, it may be considered to be the result of the noise, which distorts the signal sent by 
the source: to find out if and how the noise affects the communication it is necessary to 
compare the production of the source (original message) with the result (the received 
message). This interpretation is consistent with the technical approach of the 
communication model.  
Assuming that a message sent through the channel is somehow significant for the 
receiver, the interpretation of the feedback connection is different: this is the reaction of 
the receiver, consistent with the content of the message, not an effect of the presence of 
noise. This approach is more adequate for human communication and we may consider it 
as a basic model of the dialogue, or, at least, the technical model of the interactive 
communication. 
Both interpretations presume that source and receiver can switch from one 
position to the other, as well as the receiver became source in a second sequence of 
                                                 
6 In the paper published in 1948 the feedback connection is not figured, it appears later due to an evolution 
of communication theory toward information theory. The feedback connection is mentioned also by 
Shannon in the article wrote for Encyclopedia Britannica in 1956.  
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communication (the feedback connection); as a result, the source production is modified 
according the reaction of the receiver. Consequently, the source and the receiver are 
active participants in the communication process. 
In human communication, the most usual code is the language, where the signs 
(or signals) may be letters, sounds or gestures. The language is a set of conventions, 
largely assumed, which consist in a set of rules governing the lexical (vocabulary) and 
syntactic (grammar) conditions for an intelligible message. The basic, the signifier-
signified relation7, links a word (or another image of an object) with the conceptualization 
of the object. It is important to mention that the signifier (or the word, etc.) is a 
convention, culturally dependent, while the signified has a real correspondent which may 
be common for many cultures. 
Interactive communication requires more than a code (the language’s rules 
governing a message) to be effective: the message has to be significant for the user, or, in 
other word, message should have a particular meaning. The meaning reveals a relation 
between the sender and receiver’s knowledge and the content of the message; it is a 
personal valeur (Saussure) of the word, due to the experience, culture and education. 
Only under this condition sending or receiving a message became an active process, and 
this process is socially and culturally conditioned.  
In fact, the message itself has no meaning. Berlo (1960) states a number of 
thought-provoking observations on the nature of meaning; three of these are highly 
interesting: 
- Meanings are not in the message; they are in the message-users  
- Meanings are never fixed; as experience changes, so meanings change  
- No two people can have exactly the same meaning for anything 
According Berlo8, sender encode and receiver decode the message through a filter 
including common skills (i.e., speaking, writing, and hearing, listening, respectively), and 
particular skills (thought and reasoning); these last are related to the knowledge, social 
system, culture and attitudes.  
Certainly, there should be a common value, or a basic meaning of a word, which 
both sender and receiver share in the communication process. Rather, the meanings are 
only similar and not identical. This minimal condition of the message is the denotative or 
referential dimension of the meaning, which reflects the sign à object relationship. Also, 
there is a personal dimension, or connotation, the meaning which individuals associate 
with a sign9.  
Barthes (1987) considers more than one level of meaning. The first is denotation, 
the connotation to be a second-order of signification. In this framework connotation is a 
                                                 
7 There are two words to denote same science: semiology, according to Swiss linguist Ferdinand de 
Saussure (in Cours de linguistique generale, published in 1915 after his death), and semiotics, by the 
American philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce. There are not essential differences between semiology and 
semiotics, except the basic relation: for Saussure this is a dyadic relation, as mentioned, and for Pierce is a 
triadic relation – sign, object and interpreter. Despite this, the two words define same science, because the 
basic relation is only an analytical tool, and do not affect the assumptions, principles or results. For the 
dialogue’s topic, the Saussure representation, which evolved from linguistic studies, is more adequate.  
8 See the SMRC model, in Berlo (1960). 
9 Modern semiotics considers two more dimensions of the meaning: structural – the meanings given by the 
formal grammatical structure of the code, and contextual – the meanings we get from the context 
surrounding the sign. These may be interpreted both as common and personal dimensions. 
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sign which derives from the signifier of a denotative sign (so denotation leads to a chain 
of connotations). This is the mechanism by which signs may seem to signify one thing 
but are loaded with multiple meanings. 
The semiotic approach sees communication as a mutual negotiation of meaning 
rather than a linear transfer of messages from transmitter to receiver. We must observe 
that the minimal requirement of the meaning (denotative or referential) is sufficient to 
communicate interactively. In the Blake’s pattern of dialogue (1996), this is the position 
of sameness, as long as all dialoguers share an identical meaning of the message. 
This situation is both rare and unsuitable, except, perhaps, the dialogue which is a 
narrative support in nature. But, assuming that dialogue has other purposes, 
argumentative, interaction or explorative, a semantic differential (Osgood, 1957) should 
be presumed. This means that the personal dimension or connotative aspect is essential to 
start and sustain a dialogue where inclusiveness and exclusiveness meaning creates a 
basis of the dialoguer’s attitude and position. 
 
The efficient dialogue 
 
When a dialogue is an ongoing process, it creates stable communication 
structures, or dialogical groups. It is natural to consider the emergence of one group 
having a certain a priori purpose, even it appears accidentally. The word ‘purpose’ might 
refers to debate a subject, to reach an agreement or to explore the significations of one 
term. It is also natural to examine how adequate is the structure, and it might be 
expressed in two ways: how large should be the group, and how many time is necessary 
to reach the purposed objective. 
 
1. The size 
 
The number of the group’s members is important for two reasons. First, it requires 
a minimum number of people connected one to others, as well as the group can work as a 
stabile structure. This is the critical size above which groups cease to be able to function 
effectively. Friedman10 (1974) emphasizes that an individual, or a collective body for that 
matter, can only maintain a very limited number (‘valency’) of effective contacts thus 
forcing the communication pattern into a stable form. Usually, this number is 3 to 5 for 
groups in a state of tensed dynamic equilibrium, where non-hierarchical pattern is 
essential to its integrity11. 
Secondly, we must observe that the structure is efficient if provide a maximum of 
benefits for all the actors. Larger groups are not necessary more efficient as knowledge 
exchange structures. Helsley and Strange (2004, p. 4) shows that “membership in larger 
group does not always enhance knowledge transfer. This is because when the number of 
agents is large, it is easier for an agent who withholds knowledge to go unpunished. 
                                                 
10 See also: Representation, Comprehension and Communication of Sets; the role of number, (1979); Judge 
(2004); Blake (1996).  
11 Groups engaged in a dialogue according Bohm theory are larger, 10 to 40 peoples, who sit in a single 
circle, for a few hours during regular meetings or for a few days in a workshop environment. Participants 
"suspend" their thoughts, motives, impulses and judgements – exploring and attempting to "think together" 
collectively. 
 9
Thus, the sustainable level of knowledge barter is smaller in large groups. This result 
suggests that the formation of exclusive groups may not be motivated only by sorting but 
also by the need to create groups small enough so that cooperation is possible”. 
 
2. The duration 
 
An efficient dialogical structure is the one which reach the objective as soon as 
possible, examining all the significances of the subject. The duration of the dialogue 
depends dramatically on the qualification of the group members: if the members of the 
groups are randomly selected, an efficient dialogue is a very difficult if not an impossible 
task: not all 3, 5 or other number of members in a group can establish such a structure, 
and it is enough to observe the condition of the common language. When the expertise of 
group members is adequate to the dialogue objective, the duration varies on the group 
size: smaller groups need a short period to debate or reach an agreement, for instance, but 
with loss in meanings. On the other hand, larger groups require more time to achieve the 
goal, but they might provide a more accurate solution. 
The efficient dialogue is a balance between the group size and the duration of the 
dialogue process. It is adequately is to consider the activity level inside the group to be 
relevant for this dimension. Thus, the optimum criterion is related to the ability to 
communicate inside a structure and the duration to be done by the possibility to 
communicate. 
Let consider a number of n actors involved in a dialogue group. The members of 
the group may take three positions in the dialogue process, according Blake (1996): YES-
AND, NO-BUT, and sameness. They are actively connected if they engage dialogues and 
share meanings with other members of the group, namely if they express explicitly one of 
the position YES-AND or NO-BUT. Otherwise, they do not express the position or if 
they are in a sameness situation, they are passive participants in the others’ debate.  
Members can dialogue with the others and debate or negotiate meanings under the 
previous assumptions only in a two-way communication structure. It means that the 
dialogue is active in a one-to-one conversation, or interactive communication, when 
actors switch between two positions – sending and receiving a message. Thus, the 
dialogue process in a group consist in create one-to-one connections between members; 
these connections change during the dialogue process, as well as all members can connect 
each one other. 
In a group with n members the total number of the possible connections is:  
1)-n(n
2
1)-n(n
22C 2n ==
 
Certainly, this number reflects all combinations of two actors involved in 
communication processes, and not the simultaneously effective connections; this last one, 
obviously, equals half of total number of users.  
Let 2k to be the number of the group members connected at the time to the 
dialogue; we will name the ratio: 
1)n(n
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C
C
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the group availability index. The value of the index vary from 0 to 1, respectively for 
k=n/2, (when all simultaneously possible connections are effective) and k=0 (when no 
connection is realized). The lowest non-zero value will be called marginal availability 
(iom), and it is equal to 2/n (n-1) for k=(n-2)/2. Reciprocally, the highest value different 
from 1 will be the maximal availability (ioM), equals to (n-2)(n-3)/n(n-1) for k=1. The 
minimum number of users satisfying simultaneously these two conditions (when iom= ioM) 
is n=4; this group size is important for the reason that is the lowest level where group 
dialogue can produce some effect. Note that the number is consistent with the result 
obtained by Friedman (1974). 
The availability index is a technical measure of the inactivity inside the dialogue 
group. Correspondingly, we may also express the activity level as group-loading index:  
We must note that only an inactive member may realize an active connection with 
another inactive member depending on the availability index; he/she may be the sender of 
the message (and initiate the active connection), or the receiver. Because these positions 
in this new connection are indistinctive at a time, when 2k users are connected the 
probability to determine who is the sender or the receiver in a new contact is (n-k)/n. For 
this value, we have the theoretical availability index (it):  
When io=it, we have an optimum condition for the group activity, which signify 
the maximum probability to realize a new connection at a highest group loading level. 
The solution in k of the equation expresses the value where the system is in equilibrium; 
there is only one positive solution, k=n/3 and we obtain the expression of the equilibrium 
index (ie), which must reflect the optimum condition:  
 
The value of this index is strictly lower than 1/2, as well as the probability for a 
member to realize a new connection is strictly higher than ½, which verify the optimality 
condition.  
The system might be far from equilibrium and optimality in two situations:  
- when k>n/3, the equilibrium index is higher than ½, then the probability to 
realize a new connection decrease; the system is suboptimal due to the loss of meaning, 
as long as the actor cannot exchange messages; 
- when the k<n/3, the equilibrium index is lower than ½, then the probability to 
realize a new connection increase; the suboptimality refers to the low level of the 
dialogue process inside the network, and might be done to an inappropriate structure of 
participants. 
We may also verify these conclusions. We assume that the dialogue process is 
finite, in a T period of time. During the process the group members change messages and 
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meanings, but members contribute differently to the dialogue; thus, each one has a 
particular opinion (or meaning) to share with the others by dialogue, and T depends on 
the total number of these opinions. We suppose too that all members share a common 
meaning – a denotative meaning – and all of them have at least one particular connotative 
meaning to communicate. For computational reason we will consider the number of 
meanings to be the contribution of each member of the group; the total number of 
meanings involved in the group dialogue has a normal distribution among group member.  
Let be ∆t a time period to communicate one meaning, equal for each actor; we 
define the marginal duration of the dialogue (T) the number n of ∆t period required to 
satisfy the entire demand for dialogue, as well as any group member may be active and 
communicate one meaning at least one time and at most n times. The total number of 
active connections during this time equals the sum 1+2+...+n and T is proportional to the 
maximum number of simultaneous connections:  
This result shows that in the most severe condition of the dialogue process (when 
all members of the group are connected simultaneously) one meaning of the total number 
of meanings shared among the group members remain unexpressed. We may only 
suppose that this one is the denotative meaning and, in this condition, we may observe 
that denotative meaning is not significant in the dialogue process.  
When the total number of active contacts decrease, the loss in meaning increase 
logarithmically; for instance, if one possible contact remain inactive the loss in meanings 
is higher than 1:  
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The conclusion is that a group dialogue should be planned in a manner to ensure 
the possibility for each member to be active at least one time, even if it means to double 
the total duration of the process; at the optimum level (k=n/3) this is T+[(n+3)/2]∆t, for 
no loss in meanings condition. 
 
Foresight-oriented dialogue 
 
In a recent paper, Staton (1996) says: “A strange thing about foresight is that you 
rarely hear anything about the future.” In the author’s view this is a not surprisingly 
idea, because the future, as defined usually, is not, and cannot be, the major topic for the 
foresight activities. The argument is that the future, as an extension of the present, is not 
adequate for foresight purposes: the future is shaped by conflicting and competing 
discourses and ideologies, while the foresight claims for a stable environment, where 
debate and consensus may be possible. Nor methodological tools are adequate: “Current 
approaches to foresight emphasize discussion, consensus building, network building, 
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inclusiveness, interactivity, process benefits, dialogue - we are all familiar and 
comfortable with these approaches and methods. […] In brief, I would suggest that it is 
very difficult, perhaps impossible, that the future, the future in a strong sense – the future 
proper, a future other than an extrapolation of the present – can ever emerge out of this 
dialogic process”.  
This position illustrates a common confusion generated by a weak distinction 
between one action which support a particular activity and the activity itself, and it is not 
only the case of foresight. The foresight does not consist in a dialogue related to one 
specific topic, whatever complex and extended might be. The dialogue, in this case, may 
be seen as a support action for the foresight activity, or as a resource which may offer 
solutions for sustaining it. This is a ‘dialogue in’ for the foresight, and the discussions 
may focus on various related themes: sustainability, science-society dialogue, 
environmental policy etc. The purpose of this dialogue is to reveal new meanings for 
‘foresight’, as a second-order significant (Barthes, 1987). Certainly, words like future, 
vision, forecast etc. may not be mentioned, but any loss in meaning:  in fact, there is a 
third-order of signification for these words.  
Dialogue might be also considered as an activity itself, even in relation with 
foresight. This is a ‘dialogue about’ the subject, which is concerned on a denotative 
meaning of the word: the dialogue will emphasize the connotations of the related words 
like future, vision, forecast etc. and the purpose is to negotiate a common meaning for the 
subject-word, foresight. 
 
1.  A foresight ‘dialogue about’  
 
As in many cases, it is not one definition for the word “foresight”; the term is 
often used in connotations with “futurology”, “futures studies” “prospective studies” and 
so on. Some kind of mutual agreement seems to be realized on what foresight is not: 
prediction or forecast.  
In fact it is difficult if not impossible to find a definition for ‘foresight‘, in the 
terms of Aristotelian logic – genus proximus and specific difference. The meaning of the 
word ‘foresight’ is more general than ‘prediction’, ‘policy-making’ or other related 
words; as well the genus proximus is ‘foresight’ itself and no specific difference will be 
emphasized. Thus, any definition will cover a ‘semantic space’ related to the 
requirements of one particular model and the sum of all possible definitions became a 
‘microcosm of the large culture’ (Bohm, 1991) instead of a largely agree meaning.  
A foresight ‘dialogue about’ purpose is not to find a common language to extract 
a meaning of the word from all particular definitions; it might be a never ending 
challenge. The aim is to find all the elements, at the denotative level of meaning, which 
may appear in the definitions.  
First of all we must observe that the word ‘foresight’ defines a human activity 
founded on knowledge, essentially a scientific research both fundamental and applicative, 
covering a large area of themes. Whatever heterogeneous this area could be, foresight 
should provide common attributes, valid for any particular theme.  
One “official” definition12 states: 
“Foresight covers activities aiming at: 
                                                 
12 http://cordis.europa.eu/foresight/definition.htm 
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• Thinking the future: Forecasting, technology assessment, future studies and 
other forms of foresight try to identify long term trends and thus to guide 
decision-making.  
• Debating the future: Foresight is a participative process involving different 
stakeholders.  
• Shaping the future: Foresight aims at identifying possible futures, imagining 
desirable futures, and defining strategies”. (CORDIS). 
Regarding the nature of the foresight activities, there are two elements to be 
emphasized13:  
- the anticipative approach, where the knowledge is in position to explore 
trends of the future and to define reasonable objectives 
- the strategic approach, which define the road to follow to achieve the 
proposed objectives 
Foresight is defined, as well, by these two aspects which are inseparable. An 
activity consisting, for instance, in “policy-making processes, in which collective 
learning is developed in the S&T (Science and Technology)-related area via interaction 
between industrial, academic, governmental and social actors” (Rémi Baré, cited by 
Rask, 2007) might be anything else than foresight.  
A ‘dialogue about’ in foresight is related to the connotations of “anticipation” and 
“strategy”, where particular values refer to the scope of foresight applications. Thus, 
more domains are included in foresight programs and more peoples (stakeholders) 
involved, more meanings for “foresight”. 
Such a dialogue provides the essential characteristics of the Bohmian dialogue: 
a. The dialogue emerges spontaneously, due to the fact that foresight 
domains are strongly interrelated: anticipative studies do not ignore the 
reciprocal implications in identifying possible future evolutions in other 
domains, and the policy-making frame includes multidisciplinary 
patterns. Under these constraints stakeholders must be involved in more 
than one foresight program, as well as the dialogue became an extended 
participative process. 
b. The dialogue is purely exploratory, its meanings and its methods 
continue to unfold. The dialogue can begin by any topic of interest to 
the participants. No rules are enforced to conduct dialogue, no ex ante 
purpose is provided, no predefined results are expected. Dialogue is 
determined only by the willingness to explore and the only foreseeable 
result is creating a pool of common meanings.  
c. The dialogue creates an “open space” where people can interact with 
no restrictions. All issues important for one participant are raised and 
submitted to all participants to debate. The most important attribute of 
the dialogue in an open space is the multidisciplinary of approaches. 
The globalization and communication technology contributed to a wide spread of 
knowledge, a simpler messaging, and dialoguers’ virtual encounters. “Open space” 
switch from virtual to real, since everybody may access any information and contribute to 
the global knowledge. It droved finally to a ‘depersonalization’ of dialogue, as well as 
                                                 
13 In the definition above is also mentioned the extension of the foresight, both on research field and on 
person involved; this aspect is not related to the nature of this activity, but to the methodological tools. 
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communication between abstract entities is not anymore a metaphor. Foresight itself is, in 
this view, a dialogue, namely a ‘science-society’ dialogue. “When experts, stakeholders 
and decision-makers are involved in the foresight process, the knowledge, assumptions, 
values, wishes and visions of these people are activated and included and mutual-
learning processes initiated. Such processes are therefore in effect science-society 
dialogues” (ERA Net, 2006). 
 
 2. A foresight ‘dialogue in’ 
 
‘Dialogue in’ examine the dialogue process as a methodological tool for 
sustaining foresight activities, focusing on particular topics. The purpose is to develop 
adequate forms of dialogue, as well as the available resources of the research fields are 
better assigned to achieve their own goals.  
In a more general model, Judge (1992) considers a systematic model for the 
relation between the resources involved in human activities and the typology of the 
dialogue required by the actions’ efficiency. The author considers four types of resources 
(spiritual, knowledge, human and material) and four groups of varieties of dialogue 
(‘arenas’), correspondingly: Adaptive dialogue, Innovative dialogue, Transformative 
dialogue, and Becoming dialogue. Foresight, apparently, may be framed as a 
transformative dialogue, but it is also a strongly related with innovative and adaptive 
dialogue too. 
In fact, it is difficult, if not impossible, to rely one particular activity’s dialogue 
style of a particular variety of dialogue14. Most of the cases there is no about a single 
form of dialogue; a more adequately formula is a mix of appropriate dialogues, according 
specific tasks involved in the activity. In foresight, anticipative and strategic approaches 
require different varieties of dialogue, and specialized topics (like participation, learning 
etc.) in specialized fields (information technologies, sustainable development, health, 
nanotechnologies etc.) must adopt more particular solutions for the dialogue process.  
1. Prospective studies, as the main formula of the anticipative approach, require a 
large participation and various perspectives to see all implications of one single vision. 
They are essentially explorative and interdisciplinary, (as in the Bohmian dialogue), but 
do not emerge spontaneously. Moreover, an ex ante purpose is an expected result should 
be presumed. Also, the ‘open space’ is limited to a number of specialized topics, as well 
as stakeholders are, generally, experts in particular domains.  
The dialogue’s main purpose in prospective studies is to ‘find the truth’, thus it is 
argumentative and learning oriented. In nature, such a dialogue is Platonian, where 
personal knowledge, feelings and visions must lead to an impersonal and realistic result, 
which is not negotiated.  
The nature of foresight ‘dialogue in’ appears to be dual, both Bohmian and 
Platonician. In fact, the dialogue process has two levels:  
a. Inside core groups, where the dialogue is organized around the proposed 
topic and the rules to conduct dialogue are adequate to find a common 
point of view. Such groups require a high level of expertise, not 
                                                 
14 Author itself mentions: “Certain issues prove unresolvable leading to a dialogue crisis. Reliance on the 
approaches to dialogue in a particular arena is then recognized as inadequate to the challenge. The arenas 
may then be understood as ‘feeding into’ each other” (Judge, 1992; see also Blake, 1996). 
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necessarily interdisciplinary. The dialogue prove a dominant Platonian 
dimension, and this is the rule; also, dialogues may be organized randomly 
– some kind of operational research techniques – which is the exception. 
b. Between core groups, emphasizing the interdisciplinary aspects. This 
dialogue might be Bohmian, in the sense that it may appear spontaneously, 
aims and purposes may be ignored, and rules to lead dialogue are not 
necessary; this is the case when dialogue is not systematically organized. 
Relations between groups might be established on a thematic and 
timetable base, but does not reject any casual contact. 
2. Policy-making studies require consensus to enforce the results. It is here an 
intercultural dialogue, where collective perceptions, feelings and visions play a very 
important role. In policy-making dialogue stakeholders involved are, in fact, groups or 
representatives of homogenous collectivities, not necessarily experts in the field of 
interest for the foresight dialogue. The purpose of the dialogue is to reach an agreement, 
which may be not the most adequate to the objective revealed by the prospective studies, 
but the largely accepted.  
The foresight ‘dialogue in’ on policies is possible if some preliminary 
conventions are enforced. This condition is essential due to the strong social component 
of these approaches. As well, dialoguers should consider the collective identities to be 
equally respected for all stakeholders. They must also accept that efforts to enforce the 
negotiated result are equitable distributed, preserving the interest of each group.  
The policy-making dialogue reveals an existential dimension of the dialogue, as 
philosophy and attitude to engage with others. The dialogue is possible because peoples 
are relational beings and it takes place in “the space between” (Bubber, 1947); the 
policy-making dialogue has the role to maintain it fair and trustful. Without a trustful 
engagement with the other, a turning towards dialogue is impossible. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Each activity develops particular variety of “mix of dialogues” processes 
depending on activity’s nature and complexity. There are a strong relation between the 
dialogue and corresponding activity, but the mentioned activity does not consist in 
dialogue. The dialogue might be expressed as an ‘alter ego’ of the activity or as a 
reflection in knowledge and communication of the actions sustaining the activity. 
Foresight is homogeneous activities as it combines anticipative approach and 
prospective approach in a unique body of knowledge results. The correspondingly “mix 
of dialogue” should provide same attribute of homogeneity, in respect of efficiency 
criteria. 
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